Legislative update : Covering the cost of terrorism by Charles Gerena
T
he tragic events of Sept. 11, 2001, made it frighteningly
clear that the United States was vulnerable to terrorist
attacks. Fear suddenly gripped the nation, including
insurers faced with claims that surpassed the record $17 billion
in insured losses from Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Uncertainty
about future attacks led to a much-publicized shortage of ter-
rorism coverage that rippled through the economy. In response,
Congress approved a bill last November that puts Uncle Sam
in the terrorism reinsurance business.
Reinsurance companies provide primary insurers with addi-
tional capital to cover extraordinary claims after a major dis-
aster. But the Sept. 11 attacks forced reinsurers to reassess the
likelihood and extent of damage from terrorists. Many firms
decided to stop underwriting terrorism risks when policies
came up for renewal in 2002. With fewer
reinsurers willing to risk their capital,
primary insurers were forced to lower their
maximum payouts on terrorism-related
claims, increase premiums to cover terror-
ist attacks separately, or exclude coverage
altogether.
England faced the same problem in the
1990s. Reinsurance firms dropped or limited
their terrorism coverage in response to a
long string of bombings perpetrated by the
Irish Republican Army. This led business
interruption and building insurers to reduce
their exposure to terrorism-related risks. The
British government responded by creating
a mutual company that provides reinsurance
to  its member firms. Spain, France, and
Germany also have federal reinsurance programs that cover
terrorism risks, while Israel has a special fund that pays for
property damage triggered by politically motivated violence.
Why have governments stepped into the private mar-
ketplace to cover terrorism risks? After a major disaster, “cov-
erage declines and prices go up because insurers don’t have
as much capital” to cover claims in the near term, says Anne
Gron, assistant professor of management and strategy at
Northwestern University. Eventually, however, rising prices
“encourage capital to come into the industry” and insurers
determine how to cover a similar disaster in the future.
Robert Hartwig, senior vice president and chief econo-
mist at the Insurance Information Institute, believes that it
would have taken awhile for the terrorism insurance market
in the United States to adjust. “And some insurers wouldn’t
have participated [in the market] at all,” he adds. 
Congress decided not to wait. The Terrorism Risk Insur-
ance Act nullified existing exclusions of terrorist acts and
required insurers to cover terrorism in a manner that “does
not differ materially” from other aspects of their policies.
The bill also created a federal program that will back the
insurance industry when an attack results in claims exceeding
$5 million. For each claim, the program will cover 90 percent
of insured losses paid to policyholders. But this coverage kicks
in only after the insurer meets a deductible based on its pre-
miums received in the previous year. In 2003, the deductible
will be 7 percent of premiums collected, then it will rise to 10
percent of premiums in 2004, and 15 percent in 2005.
Lawmakers were concerned that the high costs of terrorism
insurance could damage an already soft economy. In particular,
they worried that, without government action, many new con-
struction projects would be postponed or foregone.
Some insurance experts argue, though,
that Congress didn’t need to create a broad
reinsurance program. That’s because the
shortage of terrorism coverage has affected
mostly high-profile properties and densely
populated cities. The Consumer Federation
of America recently researched the avail-
ability of coverage and found that “there
were very few problems, mostly centered in
New York City,” says J. Robert Hunter, direc-
tor of insurance of the Arlington, Va., group.
“The problem with New York is that all of
the buildings are right up against each other.
If a bombing occurs, it hits a whole bunch
of places at once. Insurers were worried
about concentration of risk.” Chicago also
had problems, but not Los Angeles since it
is spread out over a larger geographical area.
Another argument against federal terrorism reinsurance
is that insurers were already making progress in calculating
and pricing terrorist risks. Premiums for some policies were
falling and new risk models were in the works.
Finally, Hunter and others worry about the economic impli-
cations of the federal government providing reinsurance at no
cost. Will the private sector be less willing to offer reinsurance
because they won’t want to compete? Will insurers be less likely
to encourage their policyholders to reduce their terrorism risks
because they won’t suffer the full financial consequences?
Despite these concerns, the new program will hopefully
introduce certainty into the insurance industry. “Insurers
understand that in the event of a future terrorist attack they
are going to sustain losses,” concludes Hartwig. Now, “insur-
ers know what their maximum possible loss is. [And] they
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